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ALDISERT, Circuit Judge 
                         I.  Introduction 
    This case brings to a close our supervision of more than 
four decades of litigation designed to desegregate the public 
schools of Delaware.   
    However, we do not end our supervision hastily.  After the 
Delaware schools' rudimentary attempts at desegregation were 
deemed insufficient by the district court in 1957, and by this 
court in 1960, judges of this circuit blazed new jurisprudential 
trails in 1975 by requiring an interdistrict remedy.  By 1977 and 
1978, the judiciary had fashioned detailed orders for primary and 
ancillary relief which, together with the factors set forth by 
the Supreme Court in Green v. County School Bd. of New Kent 
County, Va., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), constituted the marching orders 
for the school system.   
    Still, it was not until almost 20 years later (and 35 years 
after this court announced dissatisfaction with an original plan 
that called for grade-by-grade desegregation over a 12-year 
period) that the district court could announce that the marching 
orders had been obeyed:  The school system has achieved unitary 
status by complying in good faith with our detailed desegregation 
decrees and by eliminating to the extent practicable the vestiges 
of de jure segregation.  This was the ruling of the district 
court embodied in a judgment entered after a lengthy hearing.  
The Coalition to Save Our Students ("Coalition"), the 
representative of the plaintiff class, has appealed.  We will 
affirm. 
    It is beyond dispute that racism and bigotry continue to 
tear at the fragile social fabric of our national and local 
communities, and that our best efforts as citizens are needed to 
address this problem at many levels.  However, as the district 
court observed in the case at hand, court-supervised school 
desegregation alone cannot eliminate racial discrimination:      
    [A]s the years have passed since Brown I and II [Brown v. 
    Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and Brown v. Board of 
    Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955)], it has become apparent that the 
    school desegregation process has been unable to eliminate or 
    overcome racial discrimination in the "myriad factors of 
    human existence" outside the school environment . . . . 
Coalition to Save Our Children v. State Bd. of Educ. of State of 
Del., 901 F. Supp. 784, 823 (1995) (quoting Swann v. Charlotte- 
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22 (1971)).  Or as the 
Court succinctly put it in Swann: "One vehicle can carry only a 
limited amount of baggage.  It would not serve the important 
objective of Brown I to seek to use school desegregation cases 
for purposes beyond their scope . . . ."  Swann, 402 U.S. at 22. 
    In light of this sobering truth, it is all the more 
important that we write the final chapter in this long period of 
supervision by the federal courts and release our provisional 
grip on the administrators and educators of Northern New Castle 
County, for only in so doing can we permit them to resume their 
full role in the larger social and political effort to make our 
nation worthy of the best ideals of its members.  The length of 
the discussion that follows is but one indication of the 
importance and sensitivity of the task at hand. 
 
                     II.  Procedural History 
    Historically, Delaware required its public school pupils to 
attend segregated schools.  Del. Const. art. 10  2 (1950) and 
Rev.Code 1935  2631.  However, even before the landmark decision 
in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I), 
the Delaware courts ordered the admission of black children to 
certain schools previously attended only by white children.  
Belton v. Gebhart, 87 A.2d 862, aff'd 91 A.2d 137 (Del. 1952).  
The Supreme Court consolidated Belton with Brown I and affirmed, 
347 U.S. 483, holding that racial segregation of public school 
students deprived the minority group children of equal 
educational opportunities, in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.  See Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  The Court again 
affirmed Belton v. Gebhart in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 
U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II), remanding to the Supreme Court of 
Delaware for further proceedings to require "a prompt and 
reasonable start toward full compliance" with Brown I and "to 
effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school 
system . . . with all deliberate speed."  Brown II, 349 U.S. at 
300-01. 
    Yet notwithstanding the end of de jure segregation, the City 
of Wilmington continued to operate many racially identifiable 
schools.  Accordingly, the district court fashioned an inter- 
district remedy to eliminate the vestiges of segregation and, 
faced with the state authorities' adamant and prolonged refusal 
to discharge their responsibilities, issued a remedial decree in 
1978.  The 1978 Order required a 9-3 student assignment plan, 
which provided that all students would attend formerly 
predominantly "white" suburban school districts for a maximum of 
nine years and would spend at least three years in the formerly 
"black" school districts. 
    The 1978 Order also directed eight forms of ancillary relief 
"necessary and essential to . . . overcome the vestige effects of 
de jure segregation," including: (1) an in-service training 
program for teachers; (2) an affirmative reading and 
communication skills program; (3) new curriculum offerings; (4) a 
nondiscriminatory counseling and guidance program; (5) a human 
relations program; (6) codes of conduct providing for 
nondiscriminatory discipline; (7) the reassignment of faculty and 
staff; and (8) nondiscriminatory guidelines for construction and 
maintenance of school buildings.  Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 
750, 770-774 (3d Cir. 1978) (in banc).   
    In 1981, the district court permitted the state to 
reorganize the judicially-created school district into the 
current four districts -- Brandywine, Christiana, Colonial and 
Red Clay.  Evans v. Buchanan, 512 F. Supp. 839 (D. Del. 1981).  
In so doing, Judge Schwartz asserted that, notwithstanding the 
continued existence of "problems that may be characterized as 
vestige effects of de jure segregation, . . . [the] four-district 
plan is viewed as a good faith effort to respond to repeated 
judicial invitations for appropriate State authorities to come 
forward with their own meaningful solutions to vexing problems."  
Id. at 863, 874.  However, because Judge Schwartz found the 
"effort [to have] fallen short of the mark in the critical area 
of pupil assignment," he deferred for 60 days any order regarding 
the State Board's motion for modification of the desegregation 
decree in order to encourage "curative legislation" on the 
matter.  Id. at 872-74.   
    In 1990, Judge Schwartz made a specific finding that one of 
the districts (Red Clay) had failed to comply in good faith with 
the 1978 order.  Coalition to Save Our Children v. Buchanan, 744 
F. Supp. 582, 587-93 (D. Del. 1990).  Judge Schwartz stated that 
"the vestiges of prior official segregation [had not] been 
eradicated 'root and branch' from either the Red Clay District as 
a whole or from its student assignment patterns."  Id. at 587.  
Indeed, Judge Schwartz found that the record was "replete . . . 
with evidence of delay, obfuscation, and recalcitrance on the 
part of the Red Clay Board with respect to remedying the racial 
disparities" in that district.  Id. at 592-93.     
    In 1991, Judge Schwartz stated that, notwithstanding the Red 
Clay District's "technical compliance with this court's orders," 
he again had "very grave doubts concerning the [Red Clay] Board's 
good faith compliance with the spirit of desegregation," and thus 
could "not make a finding that the Red Clay District [was] 
operating in compliance with the Equal Protection Clause . . . ."  
Coalition to Save Our Children v. State Bd. of Educ., 757 F. 
Supp. 328, 349-350 (D. Del.1990). 
    Four years later, upon motion by the Delaware State Board of 
Education for a declaration of "unitary status," the district 
court concluded: 
    that the defendants have complied in good faith with 
    the desegregation decrees issued in this litigation, 
    that the defendants are unlikely to return to the 
    segregative practices of their predecessors, and that 
    the vestiges of past discrimination have been 
    eliminated to the extent practicable. 
 
Coalition, 901 F. Supp at 823-824.  The opinion accompanying the 
order set forth 308 factual findings, which discussed: (a) 
compliance with what have become known as Green factors (as 
originally suggested in Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 
430 (1968)) -- student assignment, faculty and staff assignment, 
transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities; (b) 
compliance with the ancillary relief provisions, endorsed by this 
court sitting in banc, see Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d at 769-74; 
and (c) student achievement, special education and dropout rates, 
which the district court labelled "Areas of Concern."  See 
Coalition, 901 F. Supp. at 818-22.  Appellant conceded compliance 
with two of the Green factors (transportation and facilities) and 
one of the ancillary relief provisions (also concerning 
facilities). 
    The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.  1331 
(1988).  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  1291 
(1988).  Appeal was timely filed under Rule 4(a), Federal Rules 
of Appellate Procedure.   
 
                      III.  Scope of Review 
    The Coalition's appeal presents us with three fundamental 
questions for consideration: first, whether the district court 
properly concluded that the four school districts of Northern New 
Castle County achieved unitary status by complying in good faith 
with the desegregation decree and by eliminating to the extent 
practicable the vestiges of past discrimination; second, whether 
the district court properly allocated to Appellant the burden of 
proving that certain racial disparities in student performance 
are proximately related to de jure segregation; and third, 
whether the district court properly excluded certain expert 
testimony proffered by Appellant.  
     
    The appeal to this court from the order declaring unitary 
status tracks a very narrow compass.  Because the district 
court's finding that the school districts have achieved unitary 
status is factual, our review of that finding is limited to the 
clearly erroneous standard.  Vaughns by Vaughns v. Bd. of Educ. 
of Prince George's County, 758 F.2d 983, 990 (4th Cir. 1985); 
United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 647 F.2d 504, 506 (5th Cir. 
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982); Keyes v. School Dist. 
No. 1, Denver, Colo., 895 F.2d 659, 666 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 1082 (1991); Jacksonville Branch, NAACP v. Duval 
County School Board, 883 F.2d 945, 952 n.3 (11th Cir. 1989).  A 
finding of fact is clearly erroneous only if the court has "the 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."  
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 
(1948).  Further, "[i]t is the responsibility of an appellate 
court to accept the ultimate factual determination of the fact- 
finder unless that determination either (1) is completely devoid 
of minimum evidentiary support displaying some hue of 
credibility, or (2) bears no rational relationship to the 
supportive evidentiary data."  Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298, 
1302 (3d Cir. 1972). 
    We have plenary review of all questions of law.  This 
includes a district court's choice, interpretation and 
application of the law to the historical facts.  Louis W. Epstein 
Family Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 765-66 (3d Cir. 
1994).  Accordingly, this court undertakes plenary review of the 
district court's allocation of the burdens of proof. 
    Finally, we review the district court's determination of the 
admissibility of expert testimony for abuse of discretion.  
United States v. Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 587, 590 (3d Cir. 
1989).    
 
                      IV.  Unitary Status 
    The primary legal issue before us is whether the Northern 
New Castle County school districts have fulfilled their 
affirmative duty to eliminate the former dual school system.  The 
ultimate end to be brought about by a desegregation remedy is "a 
unitary, nonracial system of public education."  Green, 391 U.S. 
at 436.  A school system achieves this unitary status when it no 
longer discriminates between school children on the basis of 
race.  See id. at 442.  And a school system no longer 
discriminates among school children on the basis of race when it 
affirmatively has eliminated all vestiges of state-imposed 
segregation.  Id. at 435, 437-38 (school board charged with 
affirmative duty to eliminate racial discrimination "root and 
branch"); Swann, 402 U.S. at 15 ("the objective today remains to 
eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed 
segregation").  Thus our task, simply put, is to determine 
whether the district court clearly erred in finding that the 
vestiges of de jure segregation have been eliminated in the 
Brandywine, Christiana, Colonial and Red Clay school districts.  
Green, 391 U.S. at 435; see also Missouri v. Jenkins, ___ U.S. 
___, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2055-56 (1995). 
    A critical starting point in identifying vestiges of 
discrimination is the degree of racial imbalance in the school 
districts.  This inquiry is fundamental, because under the former 
de jure regime, racial exclusion was both the means and the end 
of a policy motivated by disparagement of, and hostility towards, 
the disfavored race.  The Court's 1968 opinion in Green squarely 
addressed this issue, noting that "[t]he pattern of separate 
`white' and `Negro' schools . . . established under compulsion of 
state laws is precisely the pattern of segregation to which Brown 
I and Brown II were particularly addressed."  Green, 391 U.S. at 
435.  However, the Green Court also made clear that in examining 
the problem of racial imbalance in our schools, we are to look 
"not just to the composition of student bodies . . . but to every 
facet of school operations -- faculty, staff, transportation, 
extracurricular activities and facilities."  Id.; see also Swann, 
402 U.S. at 18 (the Green factors are "among the most important 
indicia of a segregated system.")  Because compliance with Greenfactors is 
a condition precedent to unitary status, we will 
survey each of those factors here. 
    Nevertheless, the Green factors, which address racial 
imbalance, are not the only criteria by which we are to evaluate 
whether the school districts have achieved unitary status.  We 
must also consider the eight programs of "ancillary remedial 
relief" prescribed by this court in 1978, including: (1) an in- 
service training program for teachers; (2) an affirmative reading 
and communication skills program; (3) new curriculum offerings; 
(4) a nondiscriminatory counseling and guidance program; (5) a 
human relations program; (6) codes of conduct providing for 
nondiscriminatory discipline; (7) the reassignment of faculty and 
staff; and (8) nondiscriminatory guidelines for construction and 
maintenance of school buildings.  Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d at 
769-74.  Thus we will survey compliance with these ancillary 
relief measures as well. 
    By considering both the Green factors and the eight measures 
of ancillary relief ordered by this court in 1978, we honor the 
mandate set forth by the Supreme Court in Dowell that a school 
board under federal supervision "is entitled to a rather precise 
statement of its obligations."  Bd. of Education of Okla. City 
Public Schools, Indep. School Dist. No. 89, Oklahoma County, Okl. 
v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 246 (1991) (citing Pasadena City Bd. of 
Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976)).  Together, the Greenfactors and 
the ancillary remedial relief measures constitute 
these obligations, and thus precisely frame our inquiry as we 
determine whether the district court properly ordered the 
withdrawal of federal supervision.  The essence of that inquiry 
recently was articulated by the Supreme Court: 
    whether the [constitutional violator] ha[s] complied in 
    good faith with the desegregation decree since it was 
    entered, and whether the vestiges of past 
    discrimination ha[ve] been eliminated to the extent 
    practicable. 
Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 492 (1992).   
    Given the Court's recent assertion that federal supervision 
of local school districts "`was intended as a temporary measure 
to remedy past discrimination,'"  Jenkins, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. 
Ct. at 2049 (quoting Dowell, 498 U.S. at 247), we underscore that 
the phrase "to the extent practicable" implies a reasonable limit 
on the duration of that federal supervision.  Indeed, to extend 
federal court supervision indefinitely is neither practicable, 
desirable, nor proper.   
    We are keenly aware that, for as long as we have imposed 
federal supervision on local school boards, those bodies have 
suffered the loss of their defining function -- control over 
their own schools.  Thus in the present matter the citizens of 
the New Castle school districts have been denied for nearly 20 
years what the Court has described as the "vital national 
tradition" of "local autonomy of school districts."  Freeman, 503 
U.S. at 490 (quoting Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 
406, 410 (1977)).  Additionally, we appreciate the extended 
social and economic burdens that continued supervision would 
impose on generations of innocent school children and their 
families.  The reality of these burdens becomes clear when we 
consider that a child who entered first grade in one of the 
Northern New Castle County school districts in 1976 under federal 
court supervision is now 26 years old, and possibly a parent with 
a child of his or her own in the same judicially-controlled 
school system.   
    Our concern for the autonomy of local school systems and 
their members is consistent with the established jurisprudence of 
desegregation: a fundamental purpose of our mandate to eliminate 
the dual system has been to encourage local school districts 
independently to provide high-quality educational opportunities 
for all students, a state of affairs made possible only in "a 
unitary, nonracial system of public education."  Green, 391 U.S. 
at 436.  Were we to allow federal supervision to continue after a 
finding that the school districts have complied with our 
desegregation mandate, we would effectively preclude those school 
districts from achieving that goal.  In sum, we cannot reconcile 
the prospect of indefinite federal supervision of local school 
districts with the ultimate purpose of that supervision -- to 
foster the creation of autonomous, racially balanced school 
systems.  Accordingly, we will remain attentive to the Supreme 
Court's repeated instructions that such supervision be 
"temporary" and "transitional."  See, e.g., Jenkins, ___ U.S. 
___, 115 S. Ct. at 2049; Dowell, 498 U.S. at 247. 
    With these teachings in mind, we turn now to the district 
court's analysis in this case. 
 
                      V.  The Green Factors 
    The fundamental issue before the district court was whether 
the desegregation measures taken by the school districts had 
effectively eliminated to the extent practicable the vestiges of 
the former dual school system.  In addressing this issue, the 
district court began by scrutinizing various educational factors 
initially identified by the Court in Green: student assignments, 
faculty, staff, facilities and resources, transportation, and 
extra-curricular activities.  Green, 391 U.S. at 435.  We address 
the district court's consideration of each of these factors in 
turn. 
                                  
                      A.  Student Assignment 
    Because the crux of the original constitutional violation 
was the legalized system of segregated schools, the traditional 
remedy for the violation was to desegregate the schools through 
student reassignment.  Accordingly, we ordered the consolidation 
of urban and suburban school districts.  See Evans v. Buchanan, 
582 F.2d at 759 n.5 (quoting Evans v. Buchanan, 435 F. Supp. 832, 
838-39 (D. Del. 1977) (footnotes omitted)).  The State Board and 
districts not only have adhered to the requirements of our 
student assignment order, but also have attempted to maintain a 
racial balance by consolidating districts, redrawing attendance 
zones, and instituting the busing of thousands of students.   
    Indeed, after the hearing below on the Appellees' motion for 
unitary status, the district court found that the schools in 
these districts were "among the most racially balanced schools in 
the United States."  Coalition, 901 F. Supp. at 799.  The court's 
conclusion finds ample support in the record from the testimony 
of school desegregation expert Dr. Christine Rossell.  Using an 
"index of dissimilarity," Dr. Rossell compared the racial 
balance in the four districts to a national sample of 76 similar 
districts, analyzing both the percentage of students in schools 
with certain variances and the percentage of schools themselves 
within certain variances.   
    Dr. Rossell observed that, as measured against this index, 
the four Northern New Castle County school districts have 
achieved "close to perfect racial balance."  Further, on the 
basis of her full analysis, Dr. Rossell concluded that these 
districts "are much less racially imbalanced than . . . [the] 
national comparison group."  JA 568; see also Coalition, 901 F. 
Supp. at 797.  Because the district court's finding of racial 
balance rests on Dr. Rossell's thorough analysis, it is not 
clearly erroneous.  See Krasnov, 465 F.2d at 1302 (an appellate 
court must "accept the ultimate factual determination of the 
fact-finder unless that determination . . . is completely devoid 
of minimum evidentiary support displaying some hue of credibility 
. . ."). 
    Appellant does not contest the findings of racial balance 
among schools, but argues nonetheless that segregation persists 
within those buildings, in classrooms and programs.  More 
specifically, Appellant contends that black students are over- 
represented in certain classes, such as special education, and 
under-represented in others, such as gifted and advanced 
placement classes.  However, we are mindful that in Milliken v. 
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 740-41 (1974), the Court held that the 
Constitution "does not require any particular racial balance in 
each school, grade or classroom."  See also Oliver v. Kalamazoo 
Bd. of Educ., 640 F.2d 782, 809 (6th Cir. 1980) (rejecting notion 
that school system is not unitary if black students are over- or 
under-represented in various academic courses).  Moreover, the 
district court actually made 19 findings concerning the 
circumstances of student assignments in the classrooms, 
concluding that classroom balance throughout the districts was 
exemplary.  Coalition, 901 F. Supp. at 800 (measured against a 
national sample, classroom imbalance in Northern New Castle 
County was one-third to one-half that of other schools).  We 
review these findings for clear error. 
    First, although the district court's findings of classroom 
racial balance exclude special education classes, there is no 
clear error.  In our 1978 desegregation order we expressly 
excepted "students presently attending and who in the future may 
attend . . . special education school facilities and such other 
similar special school facilities as presently exist or may be 
hereafter established . . . ."  JA 128 (Evans v. Buchanan, Civil 
Action Nos. 1816-1822, Order at 11 (D. Del. Jan. 9, 1978)).  The 
rationale for this exception is obvious and compelling: students 
-- black or white -- should not be mainstreamed (i.e., denied 
special education meant to address special learning needs and 
problems) merely to effect a racial balance. 
    Appellant is also unpersuasive in asserting that students 
are placed in special education programs (such as "intensive 
learning centers") simply because they are black.  Although in 
each of the four districts the percentage of black students in 
special education programs exceeds the percentage of blacks in 
the overall student population, the record demonstrates that 
the school districts classify students based on neutral, non- 
discriminatory state and federal criteria.  JA 829-34.  
Additionally, the districts make periodic re-evaluations of 
special education students to determine when they can return to 
regular classes.  Id.  Placement is not mandatory, because at 
several junctures, parents are empowered to reject the school's 
recommendation to place their child in special education classes.  
JA 830, 832-33.  Moreover, we note that the Appellee State Board 
has created numerous statewide special education task forces; has 
authorized five comprehensive studies relating to special 
education; and thoroughly has investigated intervention 
strategies, mainstreaming and the application of selection 
procedures.  JA 1223, 1243. 
    The Appellees' efforts to improve racial balance within 
these programs not only are commendable, but successful.  Indeed, 
in three of the four districts, the racial imbalances have 
declined.  Although we might hope -- even expect -- that this 
imbalance will soon disappear, the mere fact that black 
students remain over-represented in special education classes 
does not make clearly erroneous the district court's finding of 
unitary status.  Given that Dr. Reschly, in summarizing his 
comprehensive analysis, concluded that in these school districts 
"special education is not used as a means to separate students by 
race," Coalition, 901 F. Supp. at 821; JA 839, we will accept the 
court's finding on this issue.  See Krasnov, 465 F.2d at 1302 
(standard of review). 
    Similarly, Appellant argues that the district court's 
findings with regard to classroom assignment are clearly 
erroneous because black students are under-represented in non- 
special education classes.  This argument relies on, inter alia,the 
district court's finding 47: "[t]here is evidence that among 
high school students who achieve identical testing scores, black 
students were more likely to be placed in the lower level class 
than were white students."  Coalition, 901 F. Supp. at 801 
(footnote omitted); JA 1385; JA 4249; JA 4305-07.  To be sure, 
this finding is potentially troubling, suggesting on its face 
that black students may have been segregated from white students 
of equal testing aptitude.  However, we must consider this 
finding in the full context in which it was examined and 
presented by the district court.  Thus we must consider that in 
footnote 30, which accompanies this finding, the district court 
noted that "[t]he comparison apparently does not include academic 
achievement as measured by course performance, or whether such 
placement was requested or required."  Id.  Because this 
comparison relied on testing aptitude alone, rather than 
considering as well the important factor of academic achievement 
based on course performance, and because it is not clear whether 
the placement at issue was requested or required, we do not 
consider finding 47 to be evidence that black students have not 
received equal opportunity, nor can we reasonably conclude that 
the district court, upon its careful examination, clearly erred.  
    We observe also finding 48, which states that "[o]n the 
other hand, the percentage of minorities enrolled in honors and 
AP classes who scored over the 75th percentile in reading or math 
in the spring of 1993 is slightly greater than that of whites in 
all 4 school districts."  Coalition, 901 F. Supp. at 801; JA 
6259.  Although this finding could, as urged by Appellant, give 
rise to an inference that blacks must perform at a higher level 
than whites in order to be placed in honors and AP classes, that 
is not the sole inference that could be drawn from so limited, 
and thus malleable, a sample.  Indeed, on the basis of finding 48 
alone we may just as reasonably infer something quite different: 
that the school districts' good faith efforts to desegregate have 
paid off in terms of the improved testing performance of black 
students. 
    In any event, our task here is not to engage in such broad 
speculation, nor to choose among possible inferences from the 
data; rather, we are to inquire whether the district court's 
determination of the districts' unitary status was clearly 
erroneous.  To accord this finding its proper value, therefore, 
it must be considered in the context of other, related findings.  
This the district court did.  Indeed, in view of the district 
court's copious research, we are assured that the court 
interpreted this finding in the proper light in determining that 
the districts have achieved unitary status. 
    At the urging of Appellant, we also have examined carefully 
the district court's finding 36, which states that "[t]he extent 
to which elementary and middle school students are placed in 
classes according to their ability is unclear from the record."  
Coalition, 901 F. Supp. at 800; JA 4214-21.  This finding means 
little on its own, for it represents merely that there is 
uncertainty in the record about how elementary and middle school 
students are placed in classes according to their ability.  
Indeed, without further amplification, we are not persuaded to 
conclude that this statement cuts against the court's 
determination regarding the districts' good faith efforts to 
eliminate de jure segregation.  Again, we are required to place 
this finding in context, bearing in mind that because few 
elective classes or courses are available to students at the 
elementary and middle school levels, the selective process for 
students is far more meaningful at the high school level.  Thus 
we must consider finding 36 in light of findings 39, 40 and 45.   
    Finding 39 describes the high school class selection process 
as involving "class presentations by guidance counselors, 
booklets with course descriptions, application by students in 
consultation with family, individual guidance from guidance 
counselors, and teacher input."  Coalition, 901 F. Supp. at 800; 
JA 755-56, 771-72, 851-54, 863-66.  Not only is high school class 
selection the product of these various deliberations, but, 
according to finding 40, "[t]he parents and student have the 
ultimate say in the level to which the student is assigned."  
Coalition, 901 F. Supp. at 800; JA 1383. 
    And although finding 36 indicates that the record is unclear 
on how elementary and middle school students are placed in 
classes according to their ability, finding 45, when considered 
in its entirety, provides detailed information about the class 
placement of high school students as set forth in the margin. 
    Accordingly, when we consider Finding 36 in the context of 
these other relevant findings, we find unavailing the contention 
that finding 36 provides significant evidence that minority 
students have not received an equal opportunity to succeed in the 
pertinent school districts.  The district court's multiple 
findings on this particular issue suggest that the court did 
indeed consider "every facet of school operations" in determining 
that the districts have achieved unitary status. 
    Finally, we note finding 49 of the district court's opinion, 
which states that "[t]here is evidence that lower levels of 
instruction may not encourage achievement and may adversely 
affect the ability of a student to attend college."  Coalition, 
901 F. Supp. at 801; PX 2262 at 82; PX 2265.  As with the 
foregoing findings, although this finding may be considered 
troubling on its face, alone it is neither definitive nor 
substantial enough to show clear error in the district court's 
determination of unitary status.  The mere finding that evidence 
exists "that lower levels of instruction may not encourage 
achievement and may adversely affect the ability of a student to 
attend college," id., does not establish anything specific about 
whether that putative problem is related to disparate educational 
opportunity or treatment according to race.   
    Of course, this finding is obvious and indisputable as far 
as it goes: when students receive lower levels of instruction, 
they are less likely to feel encouraged to achieve and thus will 
be less likely to attend college.  Yet this truism merely serves 
to underscore the more fundamental question at issue here -- on 
what basis are students placed in "lower levels of instruction"?  
As we already have made clear, that basis was not racially 
discriminatory; the record does not support the claim that 
students of one race are afforded college preparation 
opportunities (advanced placement classes, counseling, help in 
preparing for college placement exams) that students of another 
race are not.   
    Thus although the finding that "lower levels of instruction 
may not encourage achievement" is problematic, especially when 
viewed in isolation, yet when considered in relevant socio- 
economic context, this statement of mere possibility cannot be 
regarded as proof that the district court clearly erred in 
determining that the school districts have achieved unitary 
status.  The district court dutifully presented this finding in 
combination with many others and, after carefully analyzing these 
findings in their totality, declared that "there is no credible 
evidence linking any current racially identifiable conditions to 
the prior violation" Id. at 823 (footnote omitted). 
    This, too, must be said.  Although the Constitution requires 
that all of its citizens have equal access to the pursuit of 
education, and that they be given equal breaks while attending 
school, it does not insist that they all finish even.  The proper 
test under the Constitution is equality of opportunity, not of 
results.  On this point we would do well to recall Edmund Burke's 
pithy formulation: "[A]ll men have equal rights, but not to equal 
things."  And indeed, Appellant articulated its commitment to 
this principle at oral argument:  "[w]e have never suggested that 
the measure here is ultimate equal outcomes." 
    That everyone does not finish even is tragic, of course, but 
it does not amount to a constitutional violation.  Nor does it 
violate the school districts' mandate regarding student 
assignment under Green.  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
district court properly determined that, as to student 
assignment, the districts achieved unitary status through good 
faith compliance with the requirements of the 1978 Order. 
 
                B. Faculty and Staff Assignments 
    Before the 1978 consolidation, the vast majority of black 
administrators and teachers served two predominantly black 
districts.  In September 1978, the districts reassigned faculty, 
administrative and other certificated staff in all eleven 
districts.  The evidence presented at trial demonstrated that 
the districts now have balanced their faculties to a degree that 
is virtually unprecedented among those school districts in this 
country that operate under court orders.  The district court 
found that the districts closely monitor the racial composition 
of their faculties and do not hesitate to block transfers and to 
make reassignments, overriding seniority where necessary, to 
ensure diverse racial representation at each school.  Coalition, 
901 F. Supp. at 802-04.  The record testimony of senior 
administrative officials from each of the four districts supports 
these findings. 
    Appellant does not refute either the district court's 
calculations or its conclusion of racial balance among the 
faculties, but nonetheless argues that the district court's 
finding that the vestiges of de jure segregation have been 
eliminated to the extent practicable is clearly erroneous because 
the overall percentage of minority teachers within the districts 
has declined by two or three percent since 1982.  Appellant's Br. 
at 10.  This gradual decline does not indicate clear error, 
however, because the shortage of minority teachers in the four 
school districts is not a vestige of de jure segregation in 
Northern New Castle County, but rather a manifestation of an 
unfortunate contemporary national trend.  Indeed, even 
Appellant's expert testified that there is a critical shortage of 
black teachers in the public schools.  JA 1167-68 (the number of 
black students graduating from colleges in the United States with 
bachelor degrees in the field of education has declined); see 
also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 482-83 (1992).  
    The record further reveals that, notwithstanding the 
shortage of available faculty, the districts hired minority 
candidates at rates two to four times greater than the available 
percentage of minorities in regional and national pools.  JA  
6566.  This is attributable in part to the extensive affirmative 
minority recruitment efforts of each of the four school 
districts.  For example, the Brandywine district has sought to 
expand its pool of potential minority hires by recruiting not 
only teachers who have received a degree in education from a 4- 
year program, but teachers who have received their B.A. or B.S. 
degrees in fields other than education and have prior teaching 
experience.  JA 620.  The Christiana district has attempted to 
recruit minority teachers by sending announcements to 
predominantly and historically black universities, by attending 
career days at predominantly black universities, and by hiring 
minorities as paraprofessionals.  JA 603.  The Colonial district 
has assembled a task force to address minority faculty 
representation.  JA 633.  And in the Red Clay district, 
occasionally a faculty position will be held open until a 
minority candidate is found.  JA 624.  Based on this record, the 
court did not clearly err in finding that the school districts 
had demonstrated good faith efforts to integrate the faculties of 
the schools.   
    We turn, then, to the racial balance among the "non- 
professional" or "classified" staff, which includes bus drivers, 
bus aides, secretarial and clerical positions, paraprofessionals, 
custodial employees, and food service workers.  The undisputed 
evidence of record establishes that the school districts have 
attempted to use the hiring process to improve racial balance on 
the staff as new openings have materialized.  For example, 
Brandywine recruits minority staff through community channels, 
focusing on community centers, neighborhood churches and 
community groups in minority areas.  JA 621.  Similarly, 
Christiana recruits through community newsletters, community 
centers, and by "word of mouth."  JA 603. 
    Appellant concedes that the districts have made such 
efforts, but argues that the districts have not reassigned the 
staff to maximize racial balance.  The district court found 
that it would be impractical for the districts to reassign these 
employees in order to attain greater racial balance.  We agree. 
    Food service workers, for example, earn approximately $3200- 
$4300 per year, working approximately three hours a day.  JA 605.  
Generally, these employees work close to where they live.  
Transferring them to a distant workplace that would require a 
long commute simply is not feasible for the salary they receive.  
Id.  Secretarial and clerical personnel would experience a 
similarly negative economic impact.  Id.  Even Appellant's expert 
acknowledged that forced reassignment of these part-time, low- 
wage employees could create hardships on these workers with 
respect to child care, commuting time, distance from work and 
expenses.  JA 1105.  Accordingly, it was not clearly erroneous 
for the court to conclude that the districts have eliminated to 
the extent practicable any residual racial identifiability in the 
schools with respect to these employees. 
    We carefully have considered Appellant's contentions with 
respect to faculty and staff assignment, and we conclude that 
there was no clear error in the district court's findings. 
 
                  C. Extracurricular Activities 
    Appellant contends that the districts have not eliminated 
the vestiges of de jure segregation from their extracurricular 
activities.  It is undisputed, however, that all extracurricular 
activities within the four districts are open to students of all 
races.  All eligibility requirements are race-neutral, and 
district officials encourage all students, regardless of race, to 
participate in a wide range of extracurricular activities.   
    Nevertheless, Appellant argues that the districts must also 
eliminate any racial identifiability that exists within each of 
these activities.  In findings 98-100, 109-110, 118 and 125-128, 
the district court indicated that, unfortunately, there exist a 
substantial number of racially identifiable extracurricular 
activities throughout the four districts.  We cannot, however, 
expect a school district to compel or deny student participation 
in non-compulsory extracurricular activities merely to effect a 
racial balance.   
    The four districts have removed financial and transportation 
barriers to participation.  JA 1164.  Moreover, each of the 
districts has demonstrated good faith efforts to reduce the 
racial identifiability of their activities through experimental 
programs.  For example, the Brandywine district invites all 
eighth graders and their parents to the high schools to meet 
representatives from the activities, JA 753; Christiana announces 
upcoming activities in newsletters and physical education 
classes, JA 740; middle schoolers in Colonial are recruited to 
participate in activities when they enter high school, JA 743; 
and in Red Clay, coaches recruit students and expose them to 
various sports through the physical education curriculum, JA 680. 
    We believe that a school district's extracurricular 
activities are unitary if they "are available to all students 
within the School District regardless of race."  Singleton v. 
Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 541 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D. 
Miss. 1981); see also Swann, 402 U.S. at 18 ("With respect to 
such matters as . . . extracurricular activities," it may be 
enough "to eliminate invidious racial distinctions.").  School 
districts need not "show equal participation."  Lockett v. Board 
of Educ. of Muscogee County, No. 991 at 55 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 18 
1994) (citing Quarles v. Oxford Municipal Separate School Dist., 
868 F.2d 750, 757 (5th Cir. 1989)).  Accordingly, we conclude 
that the record supports the district court's finding that the 
districts have eliminated to the extent practicable from their 
extracurricular activities the vestiges of past de jurediscrimination. 
                                 
  D.  Remaining Green Factors (Transportation and Facilities) 
    There is no dispute among the parties concerning the two 
remaining factors outlined in Green.  Specifically, 
transportation is provided on a non-discriminatory basis.  
Additionally, the districts successfully have remedied the 
distinctions between the facilities of the formerly black and 
formerly white schools. 
 
                       VI.  Ancillary Relief 
    The 1978 order of this court required the implementation of 
eight specific programs ancillary to the 9-3 pupil assignment 
plan.  The order required the districts to: 
    1)   formulate and implement a comprehensive in-service 
         training program for teachers, administrators and other 
         staff in order to train personnel to cope with the 
         desegregation process; 
 
    2)   institute an affirmative reading and communication 
         skills program, which does not resegregate the pupils, 
         in order to remedy the effects of the past 
         discrimination; 
 
    3)   provide curriculum offerings and programs which 
         emphasize and reflect the cultural pluralism of the 
         students, and all instructional materials, texts and 
         other curriculum aids shall be free of racial bias; 
 
    4)   institute an effective and nondiscriminatory counseling 
         and guidance program.  The counseling and guidance 
         program must insure that students are counseled on a 
         racially nondiscriminatory basis concerning all 
         programs available in the area of work opportunities 
         and opportunities for a college education; 
     
    5)   provide an appropriate human relations program . . . 
         [designed] to protect the individual dignity of 
         students and teachers and to prevent racial myths and 
         stereotypes from prevailing in schools undergoing 
         desegregation; 
     
    6)   develop . . . a code of rights and responsibilities . . 
         . provid[ing] for racially nondiscriminatory discipline 
         and . . . contain[ing] provisions to insure each 
         student in the desegregation area procedural and 
         substantive due process required by existing law.  Such 
         a code will help to provide equal educational 
         opportunity to all students by protecting them from 
         unreasonable, discriminatory, and arbitrary rules; and 
         the Board shall not administer the code on a racially 
         selective or otherwise biased basis;  
 
    7)   reassign faculty, administrative and other staff 
         personnel to insure that schools do not retain their 
         former racial identity through racially identifiable 
         faculty and staff assignments; [and] 
 
    8)   establish and enforce nondiscriminatory guidelines for 
         new construction, review of building needs and the 
         appropriateness of each proposed building project or 
         school closing. 
JA 128-30; see also 447 F. Supp. at 1014; see also Evans v. 
Buchanan, 582 F.2d at 771-73. 
    The district court offered more than 180 factual findings in 
detailing the school districts' implementation of these ancillary 
relief provisions.  In the first four years alone, more than 
$18.8 million in federal desegregation project grants were used 
to pay for human relations specialists, home-school liaisons, 
reading resource teachers and in-service programs.  The state and 
the districts maintained these programs even after the transition 
to a desegregated system.  And significantly, from 1978 until the 
unitary status petition was filed, Appellant never complained to 
the court of any failure to comply with any of the ancillary 
relief provisions.  Of these eight, the last is undisputed, and 
the seventh we have addressed in our discussion on compliance 
with the Green factors.  Thus here we will review the district 
court's findings on the first six of these ancillary measures. 
 
                      A. In-Service Training 
    The district court found that all four districts offered a 
rich array of in-service programs for their faculty, and that, 
although the focus of these programs no longer is desegregation, 
all four districts continue to offer in-service training on 
desegregation, race equity and multiculturalism.  Coalition, 901 
F. Supp. at 809.  Appellant contends that the district court's 
findings are clearly erroneous because two of the Appellant's 
experts testified that the in-service training was inadequate. 
Appellant's Br. at 25.  But a reviewing court's role is not to 
pick and choose isolated snippets of evidence.  Rather, we must 
decide, after viewing the record as a whole, whether there is 
evidentiary support for the district court's findings.  Such 
support is present; accordingly, there is no clear error. 
    In January 1978, a team from the districts drafted a 
statement listing several management goals for the in-service 
training of the faculty, staff and administration.  The first 
goal -- "[t]o orient the instructional staff to the curricular 
and instructional process" -- was accomplished through the Center 
for Conflict and Desegregation at the University of Pittsburgh 
the following month.  JA 948-49, 4373, 4376-77.  In addition, the 
team responsible for planning in-service training also realized 
at least three other goals that year.  Further, in 1978, an 
Office of In-Service Activities was established and staffed by 
two full-time personnel, JA 951-52, and all programs relating to 
desegregation were mandatory for faculty, staff and 
administrators.  JA 961-62.  Finally, even Appellant's expert 
testified that the in-service programs offered by the state at 
the time of desegregation complied with the 1978 order.  JA 1140, 
1170. 
    The record similarly supports the district court's finding 
that the districts have continued in-service training programs 
since the 1978 order.  For example, the district court heard 
evidence that from 1981 through 1994, Brandywine offered various 
workshops and courses related to desegregation, race equity and 
multiculturalism.  Moreover, all new Brandywine teachers are 
required to participate in a 12-hour induction program, which 
includes a panel discussion on issues of multiculturalism.  JA 
931. 
    Similarly, in the 1980s, various human relations specialists 
and administrators trained by the Race Desegregation Assistance 
Center at the University of Pittsburgh worked with the Red Clay 
faculty and staff in the area of cultural diversity.  DI 1936 at 
635-36, 642.  The record further reveals that from 1992 through 
1995, Red Clay also has offered in-service training on 
multiculturalism.  DX 79 at FL 12295, FL 12299, FL 12302, FL 
12304-11, FL 12313-14, DX 80; DXC 81; DI 1939 at 1806.  The 
court's findings with regard to the Christiana and Colonial 
districts likewise are supported by the record. 
 
    In light of the foregoing, we are satisfied that Appellant's 
charges have no support in the record, and thus that the district 
court properly found that the schools have met the requirements 
of in-service training. 
 
               B.  Reading and Communication Skills 
    The district court found that an affirmative and integrated 
reading program was instituted in each of the four districts.  
Coalition, 901 F. Supp. at 809.  Appellant contends that the 
finding is clearly erroneous, because the districts "failed to 
show that any reading program was implemented for the purpose of 
remedying the negative effects of the de jure segregation as 
required by the 1978 Order, or that the reading programs that 
were implemented did not resegregate students."  Appellant's Br. 
at 26.  However, although no reading program specifically 
targeted black students, we conclude from our review of the 
record that the districts nevertheless met the standard of good 
faith compliance with the 1978 Order.  
    The record indicates that a reading program was instituted  
in the schools in 1978, immediately following the issuance of the 
remedial order.  JA 967.  The program employed 110 reading 
teachers, who  
    worked with the classroom teacher to help with testing, 
    interpretation of those data from the tests, selection of 
    materials, planning of program and strategies for students 
    who needed assistance and anything that [a] particular 
    teacher wanted, to do to help the students within that 
    classroom. 
 
JA 968.   Students in grades two through nine were provided 
assistance under the reading program if they were one year or 
more below reading level, as demonstrated by standardized test 
scores.  JA 968.  Students in grades ten through twelve were 
provided assistance if they were two years below level.  Id.  And 
supplemental reading instruction was provided daily for 30-45 
minutes, depending on grade level.  JA 969.  For the most part, 
this instruction occurred in small groups within the classroom.  
Id.  The districts combined have employed between 100 and 135 
reading teachers every year since the 1981-82 school year.  JA 
4910-11. 
    Further, the court heard evidence and found facts pertaining 
to the reading programs in each of the four districts.  With 
regard to the Red Clay district, for example, the court credited 
the testimony of officials from the district and found that 
    reading resource teachers coordinate the "HOSTS" 
    program (Help One Student to Succeed) for reading- and 
    writing-deficient students.  Under the program, 
    volunteer tutors work with individual children for 45 
    minutes per week.  More than 300 students participate 
    in the program. 
 
    [Twenty five] parent educators hired by the Parents as 
    Teachers program teaches [sic] first-time parents in 
    New Castle County the importance of language and 
    reading for pre-school children.  The program has been 
    in existence since 1987.  In 1993 and 1994, the focus 
    was on teenage parents and families with multiple 
    needs. 
 
Coalition, 901 F. Supp. at 810 (footnote omitted).  The court 
found similar progress in the other districts.   
    Because these programs were meant to address the reading 
problems of every student, Appellant's argument that the program 
resegregated students is misguided.  Although the school 
districts have not excluded black (or white) students from the 
remedial reading programs to effect a racial balance, the 
districts do deploy several different programs such as one-on- 
one, small group and pull-out remedial reading programs, in which  
reading teachers either work inside the classroom or pull a given 
student out of the classroom for individual attention.  Thus we 
cannot agree that the districts' remedial reading programs have 
resegregated students; the basic requirement of good faith 
efforts to remove the vestiges of de jure segregation to the 
extent practicable have been met.  Accordingly, the district 
court did not clearly err. 
    Appellant further contends that the school districts have 
"failed to show that any `communications skills program' was ever 
implemented" in any of the districts.  Appellant's Br. at 26.  
However, there is no meaningful distinction between reading 
skills programs and communication skills programs; indeed, the 
1978 Order mandates the creation of a singular "program" to teach 
reading and communication skills.  JA 129.  Likewise, testimony 
from school officials on this point suggests that instruction for 
both skills is combined.  Thus "reading skills" and 
"communications skills" are synonymous for purposes of our 
analysis here.  Accordingly, on the basis of our foregoing 
discussion of reading skills and programs, we reject Appellant's 
argument that the districts have not complied with the 1978 
Order.   
 
                          C.  Curriculum 
    The 1978 Order required that the curriculum "emphasize and 
reflect the cultural pluralism of the students," and that "all 
instructional materials, texts and other curriculum aids shall be 
free of racial bias."  JA 129.  Appellant argues that the school 
districts "failed to show that [an] inclusive curriculum as 
required by the 1978 Order was ever actually taught in a single 
classroom or that efforts made were anything other than sporadic 
or shortlived, or that the curriculum achieved any results at 
all."  Appellant's Br. at 27.  This sweeping assertion does not 
comport with the record. 
    The record indicates that the Delaware Department of Public 
Instruction has established text selection guidelines for the 
districts to use in conjunction with their own guidelines to 
ensure racially unbiased texts and instructional materials.  The 
Department also has adopted a Comprehensive Policy for 
Multicultural Education, published accompanying guidelines, 
sponsored multicultural education and adopted multicultural 
curriculum standards.  See, e.g., DX 124 at FL 23147; DX 125 at 
FL 23172.  In April 1994, consistent with these guidelines, the 
Department sponsored a two-day Multicultural Education Institute.  
DX 52. 
    Further, the district court made specific findings that 
acknowledged efforts in each of the four districts to offer a 
multicultural curriculum.  Coalition, 901 F. Supp. at 810-12.  
Our review of the record reveals several exemplary programs, 
including the Brandywine district's extensive black history 
curriculum in the elementary schools; Christiana's inclusion of 
the minority community in the textbook selection process; 
Colonial's course entitled "Minorities USA"; and Red Clay's 
integration of cultural pluralism into the social studies, 
English language arts, art education and music education 
curriculum guides.  
    In light of this substantial record evidence supporting the 
district court's findings, we are satisfied that the court did 
not clearly err when it found that the schools have complied with 
the court order as to curricular reform. 
 
                   D.  Counseling and Guidance 
    The 1978 Order required the districts to "institute an 
effective and nondiscriminatory counseling and guidance program . 
. . [to] insure that students are counseled on a racially 
nondiscriminatory basis" concerning post-secondary opportunities.  
JA 129.  Appellant argues that the districts "failed to show that 
any effort had been made to ensure that the counseling and 
guidance programs attempted to prevent resegregation of students 
in the classroom as required by the 1978 Order or that, in fact, 
the counseling and guidance programs did not become vehicles for 
resegregation.  The School System failed to show that the 
counseling and guidance programs achieved any results at all."  
Appellant's Br. at 26.  Again, the record belies Appellant's bold 
assertions. 
    In the spring of 1978, the New Castle district formed a 
committee "to follow the directive of the Court at the time [--] 
to develop a nondiscriminatory developmental guidance program for 
all students."  JA 770.  The committee drafted guidelines, which 
the district adopted in the Handbook for Certified Guidance 
Counselors.  JA 770-71.  In 1981, the Department modified the 
guidelines for district and statewide use in the Delaware 
Guidance Handbook, K-12, which was itself revised in 1990 as 
Appendix B to the Handbook for K-12 Education.  JA 770-71. 
    The record further establishes that, from 1981 to 1991, 
these Department guidelines governed counseling programs within 
the districts.  For example, in 1990, the state directed each 
district to prepare "a written plan describing the guidance 
program for the district which is reviewed periodically and 
updated at least every five years."  DX 230 at D 1464.  Plans for 
each district subsequently were drafted and approved.  JA 755, 
769-70, 852, 864, DX 230, DX 231, DX 232, DX 233, DX 234.  The 
district programs described in the plans include academic, 
personal, social, career and life-planning counseling.  JA 1137.  
    The court's detailed description of the programs established 
in each of the districts also is supported by the record.  
Coalition, 901 F. Supp. at 813-814.  Especially mindful of 
alleged disparities in the Red Clay school district, we emphasize 
that the record clearly supports the district court's 
determination that that district administers aptitude tests, 
provides speakers, supplies ample resource material, offers 
participation in various achievement programs, and facilitates an 
extensive college visitation program.  JA 772-74. 
    In sum, it is clear that the State Board has adopted 
nondiscriminatory counseling guidelines; that all the districts 
have provided comprehensive post-secondary career, educational 
and vocational assistance; and that the districts support 
numerous supplementary counseling programs which encourage 
minorities to pursue post-secondary education.  Moreover, 
Appellant fails to cite any instance of discriminatory 
counseling.  Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not err 
in determining that this aspect of the remedial order was 
fulfilled. 
 
                       E.  Human Relations 
    The 1978 Order required the districts to "provide an 
appropriate human relations program" for "schools undergoing 
desegregation."  JA 130.  The provision was intended to be 
transitional, designed to address "the various pressures which 
arise as a result of desegregation."  Evans, 582 F.2d at 769.  
Appellant argues that "[t]he School System failed to show that 
any human relations program was actually implemented as written . 
. . or that any human relations program lasted for more than a 
brief duration or achieved any results at all."  Appellant's Br. 
at 24-25.  Nevertheless, the record supports the district court's 
findings. 
    The school districts responded to the order by implementing 
a program involving more than 100 specially trained and certified 
specialists who were assigned to schools in "biracial teams."  JA 
763-64.  Each high school and junior high school had at least one 
team, and these teams were also directed to serve a number of 
elementary schools.  Id.  These specialists provided crisis 
intervention assistance and implemented student support programs, 
such as peer tutoring and counseling.  JA 764-66.  Because the 
desegregation went smoothly, the focus of the program soon 
shifted to multicultural awareness, problem-solving and other 
student support functions.  JA 764.  The districts continued 
these services by retaining human relations personnel and hiring 
elementary guidance counselors, social workers, community 
outreach personnel, visiting teachers, student advisors, student 
relations specialists and other student support personnel.  SeeCoalition, 
901 F. Supp. at 815-16. 
    Moreover, the district court described in detail the 
progress in each of the four districts.  Again directing our 
focus to the Red Clay district, we note that "Red Clay employed 
16 human relations specialists and home/school advisors in 1981- 
82 and 18 in 1982-83" and "five human relations specialists and 
home/school advisors" as recently as 1993-94.  Coalition, 901 F. 
Supp. at 816 (crediting Defendant's Exhibit 111).  
    Notwithstanding the necessary (and welcome) shift in the 
focus of the human relations program, it clearly has lasted 
beyond "a brief duration" and has yielded significant results.  
Accordingly, these findings support the district court's 
determination that the school districts complied with the court 
order as to human relations programs. 
 
                         F.  Discipline  
    The 1978 Order required the development of a code to provide 
"racially nondiscriminatory discipline" and to ensure "procedural 
and substantive due process."  JA 130.  In July 1978, the New 
Castle district adopted a code of conduct drafted by a "committee 
[which had] gathered similar documents from Delaware and large 
desegregated school districts for review."  JA 4436.  Prior to 
adoption, drafts of the code were reviewed by citizen groups, 
student council leaders, the Teachers' Association, and 
administrators.  JA 4435-36.  The districts adopted the New 
Castle code in 1981, and each district has revised the code 
periodically since then, through a "process of development and 
continual revision that includes [the] involvement of others, 
that includes teachers, includes administrators, and there are 
processes for the codes to be reviewed by external sources and 
have input."  JA 719. 
    Appellant's discipline expert concedes that the districts' 
codes are not "discriminatory on their face."  JA 1157.  And the 
district court found that the codes "are not applied in a 
discriminatory fashion."  Coalition, 901 F. Supp. at 817.  
Appellant argues, however, that the school districts have failed 
to reduce racial disparities in discipline rates among students, 
and that Appellant was denied the opportunity to admit expert 
testimony in support of this claim.  However, on this matter the 
record supports the district court's findings, as well as its 
exercise of discretion.   
    The district court's finding that discipline is not 
administered in a discriminatory fashion is supported by the 
testimony of Dr. Charles Achilles, the school districts' expert.  
Dr. Achilles calculated indices by dividing the percentage of 
black student suspensions by the black enrollment percentage.  
Based on these data, Dr. Achilles determined that the districts' 
suspension indices reflected less racial imbalance than indices 
calculated from national suspension data compiled by the Office 
of Civil Rights and Delaware arrest data.  JA 722-23.  Dr. 
Achilles further illustrated that the indices were essentially 
consistent across the four districts -- "a result difficult to 
achieve if equitable nondiscriminatory codes were not being used 
and applied in an equitable, nondiscriminatory manner."  
Coalition, 901 F. Supp. at 817; see JA 724.  And finally, Dr. 
Achilles demonstrated "consistency in how the codes were applied 
by administrators, regardless of the administrators' race."  
Coalition, 901 F. Supp. at 817; see JA 725.  In light of this 
compelling testimony, we conclude that the district court did not 
clearly err in determining that, as to discipline, the school 
districts have complied with the 1978 Order.  See Krasnov, 465 
F.2d at 1302 (standard of review). 
    Nor did the district court err in rejecting the testimony of 
Appellant's discipline expert, Dr. William Gordon.  He could cite 
no study or authoritative literature to support his assumption 
"that 'undiscipline' or misbehavior is a randomly distributed 
characteristic among racial groups . . . ."  JA 1161.  And in 
fact, statistical data demonstrate a comparable or greater racial 
disproportion for those offenses for which Delaware law mandates 
suspension, which Gordon called "very objective" offenses, than 
for those offenses he viewed as less objective.  JA 726.  
Accordingly, we reject Appellant's argument that the schools have 
failed to reduce racial disparities in discipline rates. 
     
    We likewise reject Appellant's contention that expert 
testimony on this matter was improperly rejected by the district 
court.  A trial judge's exclusion of testimony cannot be 
disturbed on appeal "absent a clear abuse of discretion."  Semper 
v. Santos, 845 F.2d 1233, 1238 (3d Cir. 1988); Fashauer v. New 
Jersey Transit Rail Operations, 57 F.3d 1269, 1287 (3d Cir. 
1995).  In both Semper and Fashauer, the court upheld the 
exclusion of rebuttal testimony because of counsel's failure to 
adhere to a pretrial order.  Semper, 845 F.2d at 1238; Fashauer, 
57 F.3d at 1287.   
    Here, Appellant disregarded two pretrial orders requiring 
the disclosure of the "specific subject matter as to which each 
expert will testify" and the provision of expert reports 
complying with Rule 26, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
Denying Appellant's motion to delay disclosure of the identity of 
its experts, the district court stressed, more than three months 
before trial, that "[t]his is a case where the interests of 
justice dictate public disclosure of the parties' experts and 
early resolution of any potential disputes regarding any experts' 
qualifications."  JA 203, 208. 
    Rule 26 states that "[t]he report shall contain a complete 
statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and 
reasons therefor" and obligates a party to supplement the report 
if it "learns that in some material respect the information 
disclosed is incomplete or incorrect . . . ."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
26(a)(2)(B) & (e)(1).  Supplementation must be made "with special 
promptness as the trial date approaches."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e).  
Exclusion of testimony is an appropriate sanction for failure to 
supplement in a timely manner.  See Freund v. Fleetwood 
Enterprises, Inc., 956 F.2d 354, 358 (1st Cir. 1992). 
    As of November 30, Appellant knew all of the State Board's 
experts' topics and methodologies.  Appellant could have, but 
declined to, file a supplemental report for expert witness de 
Leeuw on December 9, as it did for three of its other experts.  
Appellant also could have disclosed its intent as a result of 
counsel's comments at the deposition on December 15.  Instead, 
Appellant chose the tactical route of surprise.  In light of the 
foregoing discussion, we conclude that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in excluding this surprise testimony. 
 
          VII.  Areas of Concern to the District Court   
             and Allocations of the Burden of Proof 
                                 
         Aside from its examination of the four school 
districts' compliance with the Green factors and the ancillary 
relief measures, the district court also acknowledged that 
certain performance disparities persist in the New Castle County 
schools -- most notably in the Red Clay district.  These 
performance disparities include student achievement, special 
education, and dropout rates, and are not disputed here.  
However, because these disparities are not among the vestiges 
enumerated either in Green or in the ancillary relief order, we 
must determine, first, whether these disparities actually are 
vestiges of de jure segregation, and if so, whether the school 
districts have in good faith eliminated them to the extent 
practicable.  Having considered the taxonomy of disparities 
proffered by Appellant and reviewed the record and pertinent 
legal precepts, we hold that Appellant properly was allocated the 
burden to prove that the disparities were vestiges, and that the 
Appellant failed to meet this burden.   
         The Court has made plain that certain disparities 
necessarily are vestiges of de jure segregation.  Identifying 
what would become known as the Green factors, the Court directed 
school boards to propose plans designed to disestablish state- 
imposed segregation in "every facet of school operations -- 
faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities and 
facilities."  Green, 391 U.S. at 435.  Accordingly, and as the 
relevant cases cited by Appellant demonstrate, the Court 
consistently has turned to the Green factors to "determin[e] 
whether a dual school system has been disestablished."  Columbus, 
443 U.S. at 458-61 (Green factors).  See also Davis v. Board of 
Sch. Comm'rs of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971) (pupil 
assignment); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. at 538 
(pupil assignment and school construction).  Indeed, the Greenfactors have 
become per se vestiges of de jure segregation -- and 
therefore the focal point for determining unitary status.  
Nevertheless, the performance disparities enumerated by Appellant 
are not among these factors. 
         Still, the Green factors are not the only disparities 
that may be classified as vestiges of de jure segregation.  
Depending on the circumstances of a particular case, the trial 
court still may exercise discretion to consider other factors.  
Freeman, 503 U.S. at 492-93.   The circumstances of the instant 
case prompted the district court, in 1978, to order eight 
ancillary remedial measures.  As with the Green factors, we have 
reviewed the districts' compliance with that order and conclude 
that there was a good faith effort to eliminate the vestiges 
identified therein to the extent practicable.  Again, however, 
the performance disparities urged here were not identified among 
these vestiges of de jure segregation. 
         We emphasize that here we are not discussing the burden 
of proving compliance with the Green factors or the 1978 Order, 
as to which the school districts acknowledge bearing the 
evidentiary burden.  Our discussion here, and our allocation of 
the burden of proof to Appellant, is limited to the issue of 
proving that the identified performance disparities are vestiges 
of de jure segregation. 
         Because the performance disparities claimed by 
Appellant are not among (or even similar to) the Green factors or 
the vestiges identified in the 1978 Order, we will not simply 
presume -- as Appellant urges us to do -- that these are vestiges 
of de jure segregation.  Appellant offers no persuasive authority 
for establishing a causal link between present achievement 
disparities and past de jure segregation.  In fact, all but one 
of the cases relied on by Appellant on this point are irrelevant, 
because they address only Green-type factors; the State Board 
does not dispute that it carried the burden of proving good faith 
efforts to eliminate (to the extent practicable) such vestiges of 
de jure segregation.   
         Appellant thus can rely solely on Vaughns by Vaughns v. 
Bd. of Educ. of Prince George's County, 758 F.2d 983, 990-91 (4th 
Cir. 1985), which, upon our review, supports the district court.  
In Vaughns, because the school district was not unitary with 
respect to the Green factor of student assignment, id. at 990-91, 
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the 
plaintiffs were entitled to a presumption that disparities in 
special education and gifted and talented programs arose from 
prior segregation.  More important, the Vaughns court 
distinguished a decision from a sister circuit because "the 
burden shifted to [Appellants] in that case only because the 
school system had achieved unitary status with regard to student 
assignment."  Vaughns, 758 F.2d at 991. 
         Here, however, the districts have been unitary as to 
school assignments since the 1978 order.  Had the Vaughns school 
district satisfied the Green factors as have the Delaware 
districts before us, the Vaughns plaintiffs would have had to 
prove that performance disparities resulted from de juresegregation.  The 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit so held 
in two subsequent cases.  See Riddick by Riddick v. School Bd. of 
City of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521, 534 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 
U.S. 938 (1986); School Bd. of the City of Richmond, Va. v. 
Baliles, 829 F.2d 1308, 1312 (4th Cir. 1987).  The same result 
should obtain here. 
         Further, we must respect the Court's teaching that "a 
school board is entitled to a rather precise statement of its 
obligations under a desegregation decree" and to "a like 
statement from the court" for when "such a decree is to be 
terminated or dissolved."  Dowell, 498 U.S. at 246 (citing 
Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976)).  
Because we are reluctant to impose any unstated obligation on the 
school boards, we allocate the burden to prove any additional 
violation to the Appellant.  See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2055-56 
(to require a remedy, inferior student achievement must be proven 
to have resulted from de jure segregation); see also Keyes v. 
School Dist. No. 1, C.A. Nos. C-1499, 69-M-1499 (D. Colo. Sept. 
12, 1995), slip op. at 14 ("The Court's opinion in . . . Jenkins. . . 
defeats the plaintiffs' call for compelling additional 
action to investigate and redress racial disparities in student 
achievement . . . [when the] court has never made any findings 
that such differences are the result of discrimination by the 
District"). 
         In light of the foregoing discussion, we conclude that 
Appellant failed to carry its burden.  The district court's 
finding that persistent student performance disparities were 
caused by socioeconomic factors is supported by the record.  
Coalition, 901 F. Supp. at 818-19.  The district court cited 
various demographic data from the 1990 U.S. Census and the 1992 
Vital Statistics Report of Delaware that illustrate a 
"black/white gap" in the geographic area contained in the four 
school districts, and in New Castle County generally, as to 
socioeconomic conditions.   The record establishes that "Blacks 
in the desegregation area are in an inferior position 
economically to whites, and [that] that gap is wider in New 
Castle County than it is in the nation as a whole."  Coalition, 
901 F. Supp. at 818. 
         Further, the record supports a causal link between 
these socioeconomic factors and student achievement across the 
four districts:  "There is consistency between the gap in 
socioeconomic status with the gap in achievement, with Brandywine 
statistics demonstrating the greatest disparity in both areas, 
Colonial the least disparity."  Id.  With such support in the 
record, these findings cannot be clearly erroneous.  Anchoring 
its determination on these unfortunate, but uncontroverted, 
socioeconomic factors, the court found, inter alia, that 
"[b]ecause the environment outside school is so strong, 
cumulative, and varied, schools cannot overcome such 
environmental/differences [sic] among children."  Id. at 819.  We 
agree. 
         Accordingly, we affirm the district court's allocation 
of the burden of proof and its determination that persistent 
performance disparities are not vestiges of de jure segregation. 
 
                         VIII.  Conclusion 
         The task of setting forth reasons for affirming the 
district court's judgment would have been lightened considerably 
-- and this opinion made benevolently more brief -- had the 
Coalition not chosen to mount a scatter-gun attack on virtually 
every aspect of the district court's comprehensive opinion.  
Indeed, the Coalition portrays nearly 20 years of federal court 
supervision of Delaware public education as a cheerless and 
sorrowful failure.  As our discussion has shown, however, the 
Coalition's contentions, in the main, have been expressed in 
conclusory language that neglects to demonstrate where the 
district court erred and fails to appreciate the narrow standard 
of review by which we are constrained. 
         Moreover, the Coalition repeatedly has failed properly 
to acknowledge the importance of pervasive socioeconomic 
conditions that account for discrepancies among the races in 
educational performance.  Indeed, the Coalition avoids the 
responsibility of carefully examining the roots of the continuing 
black/white achievement gap, a brutal national phenomenon first 
documented in the 1960s and substantiated in various recent 
studies that "demonstrate that if socioeconomic characteristics 
are more equalized, achievement levels are more equalized."  
Coalition, 901 F. Supp. at 819.  These studies conclude that 
"[i]t is difficult for children to take equal advantage of 
learning opportunities absent the initial and cumulative 
advantages of a stimulating home curriculum," and that "[b]ecause 
the environment outside school is so strong, cumulative, and 
varied, schools cannot overcome such environmental/differences 
among children." Id.   
         These conclusions support our belief, presented in the 
foregoing discussion, that none of the Coalition's arguments 
concerning special education, discipline and dropout rates, 
student achievement, extra-curricular activities or disparities 
in college matriculation can seriously be considered without 
weighing the impact of critical demographic data.  This the 
Coalition has failed to do, choosing instead to focus its primary 
energies on arguing for continued federal court supervision of 
the schools -- as if a federal judge's order could eliminate, 
with the stroke of a pen, broad social problems.  
         As humans, we acknowledge with melancholy the fact that 
many socioeconomic factors militate against a completely level 
playing field in our society.  As judges, however, we are 
powerless to alter formidable social, economic and demographic 
forces and conditions over which no legal precept has control.  
Moreover, we are constrained to fulfill an obligation to address 
only those constitutional questions properly presented to us, and 
to show fealty to appropriate standards of review, lest we 
abandon the limits on judicial power that give coherence to our 
political system.  The district court articulated the meaning of 
these institutional limits for this case: 
         [t]he continued existence of racial discrimination in 
         our society as a whole, and the effect of that 
         discrimination on the ability of a black child to enter 
         school on an equal footing with more privileged white 
         schoolmates, are not matters in dispute in this 
         litigation.  
 
Coalition, 901 F. Supp. at 823.  Unfortunately, in its 
presentation the Coalition repeatedly has refused to accept the 
fundamental concept that this court's scope of review is limited 
to determining whether the district court clearly erred in 
concluding that the school districts have achieved unitary 
status. 
         The history of our jurisprudence contains no true 
precedent for the micromanagement of school systems by the 
federal courts.  Indeed, our authority to supervise these school 
districts does not stem from the Anglo-American common law 
tradition, in which the law evolves through judicial reasoning 
based on legal principle; instead, our legitimacy here derives 
exclusively from the powers that inhere in equity jurisdiction, 
"another stream that flowed alongside the common law, whose 
headwaters were in the discretionary royal prerogative.  Equity 
was a more flexible process, more unprincipled, initially quite 
ad hoc."  Thus the jurisprudential basis for 20 years of 
detailed management of the Northern New Castle County school 
system has been, simply, a remedy framed in equity to enforce a 
desegregation decree.   
         This equitable remedy and, by definition, its 
jurisprudential legitimacy, were meant to have a limited 
lifespan.  The remedy was designed to serve only as an implement 
for monitoring and guidance, not as a permanent substitute for 
state and local school boards, or indeed, for the state 
legislature.  Thus in our zeal to insure maximum educational 
opportunities for all Delaware school students, the federal 
courts must bear in mind that the responsibility for 
administering the schools ultimately belongs to locally elected 
officials.  Indeed, we must acknowledge that although it has been 
proper for us to supervise multiple generations of students in 
the service of unassailable ideals, in the process we have also 
denied multiple generations of elected officials the freedom to 
participate fully in representative government.  For 20 years 
there has been a constant colloquy between federal judges and 
officers of these political institutions, a score of years in 
which to achieve desegregation "with all deliberate speed," as 
ordered in Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).         
         In ruling that the school districts of Northern New 
Castle County have at long last truly respected our specific 
orders of desegregation, the district court has cut the umbilical 
cord extending from the courtroom to the classroom.  Institutions 
that normally are free to exercise powers traditionally granted 
them (and them alone) in the American political process now are 
free to assume those powers.  The time has come for the courts to 
step back.  What Roscoe Pound said almost a century ago still is 
most appropriate: "[W]hen men demand too much of law, when they 
seek to devolve upon it the whole burden of social control, when 
they seek to make it do the work of the [school,] home and . . . 
church, enforcement of law comes to involve many difficulties." 
         The judgment of the district court declaring unitary 
status will be affirmed.  
 
Coalition to Save our Children v. State Board of Education of the 
State of Delaware et al., No. 95-7452 
_________________________________________________________________ 
SAROKIN, J., dissenting: 
         One hundred years ago, the United States Supreme Court 
turned its back on the constitutional promise of equal protection 
of the law that this country made to its African-American 
citizens in the aftermath of the Civil War.  In Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of laws requiring the racial segregation of 
public facilities, including public schools, as "within the 
competency of the state legislatures," id. at 544, and validated 
the infamous doctrine of "separate but equal."  See id. at 552 
(Harlan, J., dissenting). 
         No one at the time could have truly believed for one 
instant that there was a shred of equality between the systems 
serving the white children and black children of the dual school 
systems.  Yet it took close to sixty years for the Supreme Court 
to acknowledge the reality of segregation.  In one of the most 
glorious moments of the history of the federal judiciary, the 
Court, speaking in a unanimous voice, effectively repealed the 
"separate but equal" doctrine by holding, in Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954), that "in the field of public 
education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place." 
         Along with Topeka, Kansas, the Supreme Court in Brownwas 
considering the fates of three additional school systems: 
South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware.  Delaware became a part 
of this historic decision after the state's Supreme Court ordered 
two districts to admit black children into de jure all-white 
schools.  Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A.2d 137 (Del. 1952).  It was the 
appeal from that decision that was consolidated with the Topeka 
case. 
         There was no straight and unwavering march toward a 
color-blind school system in the aftermath of Brown, however.  
Rather, desegregation in Delaware and elsewhere has had a "long, 
tortured history," Evans v. Buchanan, 447 F. Supp. 982, 1000 (D. 
Del.), aff'd, 582 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 
923 (1980).  Resistance to the mandate of Brown was fierce, and 
at times violent.  Then-Governor George Wallace of Alabama spoke 
for many when, standing on the front steps of the University of 
Alabama in Tuscaloosa, he denounced the "illegal usurpation of 
[state] power by the Central Government" and tried to block 
admission of African-American youngsters into the state 
university system. 
         Delaware officials, as well, proved less than 
responsive to the constitutional mandate to desegregate the 
state's public schools and, as a result, the federal courts were 
compelled to enforce the mandate one ruling at a time, 
culminating with this Court's desegregation order in 1978.  Evans 
v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1978) (in banc), cert. denied, 
446 U.S. 923 (1980).  Today we are asked to lift this order. 
              The Majority accurately reflects the tortured 
history of this matter.  The elapse of four decades of litigation 
and court supervision clearly militates against its continuance, 
but it is also evidence of begrudging compliance with repeated 
court orders to desegregate.  I find it ironic that the delay in 
implementing the orders of this court to end segregation is now 
being utilized to justify the end of court intervention.  
Although it is very tempting to end judicial supervision in the 
face of substantial progress, it would be unfortunate to abandon 
it just short of success.  I dissent, not because I conclude that 
any of the findings of the district court are erroneous, but 
rather because accepting them causes me to conclude that some 
vestiges of past discrimination may remain, although I concede 
that many have been eliminated. 
              I concur with the majority's recognition of the 
need to return control of schools to local communities, but only 
if and when we are satisfied that the goals established some 18 
years ago have been substantially met.  I challenge the 
majority's suggestion that the court's role in these matters has 
"denied multiple generations of elected officials the freedom to 
participate fully in representative government."  Majority at 
68.  The denial of that participation, if it occurred, was not 
due to judicial usurpation but rather arose from the 
discriminatory and unconstitutional conduct of many of those 
elected officials.  It is not the courts who have delayed the 
return to local power, but it is those elected officials who 
failed to act "with all deliberate speed."  Brown v. Board of 
Education [Brown II], 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).  Even if we are 
to withdraw our supervision at this juncture, I see little need 
to apologize for the court's intervention in these matters.  
Without such intervention our schools would have remained 
separate and unequal and a segment of our nation would have been 
denied rights and opportunities to which all are entitled. 
 
                      I.  Shared principles 
         Before I articulate the reasons for my dissent, I want 
to underscore the shared premises under which the majority and I 
operate.   
         There is, first of all, no disagreement that "to extend 
federal court supervision indefinitely is neither practicable,  
desirable, nor proper," Majority at 16, and this is not what I 
advocate today.  At the same time, the Supreme Court has held 
that supervision by the courts should continue until "the 
vestiges of past discrimination ha[ve] been eliminated to the 
extent practicable."  Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 492 (1992).  
Because the Appellees have not met this requirement, I believe 
that withdrawal of supervision is premature at this point. 
         Nor is there any disagreement between the Majority and 
the Dissent that "[t]he proper test under the Constitution is 
equality of opportunity, not of results."  Majority at 31.  To 
the extent that the principal issue in this Dissent is the 
placement of African-American children in lower-level classes, 
and to the extent that the district court itself found that 
"lower levels of instruction may not encourage achievement and 
may adversely affect the ability of a student to attend college," 
Coalition to Save our Children v. State Bd. of Educ., 901 F. 
Supp. 784, 801,  49 (D. Del. 1995), it is their opportunity to 
succeed academically that is at stake. 
         Finally, I share the Majority's "reluctan[ce] to impose 
any unstated obligation on the school boards."  Majority at 61.   
At the same time, we should not impose or tolerate any 
limitations on the opportunity of young black students to 
participate equally in the educational process and derive all of 
the benefits therefrom.   
 
                      II.  Factual findings 
         I now turn to the substantive review of the district 
court's ruling.  First, I agree with the Majority's conclusion 
that the vestiges of segregation have been eliminated with 
respect to the following areas: intra-district student racial 
balance, Majority at 18-20; special education student assignment, 
id. at 21-24; faculty and clerical staff assignment, id. at 32- 
36; extracurricular activities, id. at 37-38; transportation, id.at 39; 
facilities, id.; in-service training, id. at 41-44; 
reading skills, id. at 44-47; curriculum, id. at 48-50; 
counseling and guidance, id. at 50-52; human relations, id. at 
52-53; and discipline, id. at 53-57. 
         However, I cannot agree with the Majority that the 
Appellees demonstrated, or that the district court correctly 
concluded, that the vestiges of segregation have been eliminated 
with respect to the following facets of school operations: 
student classroom assignment; certified staff assignment; and 
communications skills programs.  I therefore would remand to the 
district court for further findings regarding these three areas.  
In addition, because classroom assignment affects student 
achievement, I would remand for further findings regarding the 
so-called "areas of concern."  Finally, because the district 
court did not apply the correct legal standard regarding the 
exclusion of the testimony of one of the Coalition's experts, I 
would remand for further findings on this issue as well. 
                 A. Student classroom assignment 
         I note, first of all, that "the school districts 
acknowledge bearing the evidentiary burden" of proving compliance 
with this issue, other Green factors and the 1978 Order.  SeeMajority at 
59. 
         1. The district court's findings and conclusions 
         Findings 30 to 49 of the district court's opinion 
concern student classroom assignments.  Coalition, 901 F. Supp. 
at 799-401.  Findings 34 through 49 focus more specifically on 
"tracking" or "ability grouping," i.e., the assignment of 
students "to various instructional groups on the basis of 
ability."  Id. at 800-01.  Among the court's findings are the 
following: 
              36. The extent to which elementary and 
         middle school students are placed in classes 
         according to their ability is unclear from 
         the record. 
 
                              * * * 
 
              38. In 1993, the percentage of 
         minorities in the self-contained honors and 
         gifted student program at Burnett Elementary 
         School [the only self-contained "gifted" 
         student program in the 4 districts, id. at 
         800 n. 27], who scored above 85% on exams is 
         slightly greater than that for the other 
         groups. 
 
                              * * * 
 
              46. A review of the percentages of the 
         racial groups who were taking college and 
         non-college prep classes illustrates that: a) 
         a little over 50% of Brandywine's black 
         students in grades 9-12 were taking non- 
         college prep English, whereas a little less 
         than 20% of Brandywine's white students were 
         taking that level of English; b) a little 
         over 60% of Christiana's black students in 
         grades 9-12 were taking non-college prep 
         English, whereas a little less than 25% of 
         Christiana's white students were taking that 
         level of English; c) a little over 50% of 
         Colonial's black students in grades 9-12 were 
         taking non-college prep English, whereas a 
         little less than 35% of Colonial's white 
         students were taking that level of English; 
         d) a little over 40% of Red Clay's black 
         students in grades 9-12 were taking non- 
         college prep English, whereas a little less 
         than 17% of Red Clay's white students were 
         taking that level of English.  Less than 5% 
         of black students were enrolled in advanced 
         English in the high schools of the 4 
         districts; however, over 20% of white 
         students were at that level. 
 
              47. There is evidence that among high 
         school students who achieve identical testing 
         scores ["The comparison apparently does not 
         include academic achievement as measured by 
         course performance, or whether such placement 
         was requested or required."  Id. at 801 
         n.30.], black students were more likely to be 
         placed in the lower level class than were 
         white students. 
 
              48. On the other hand, the percentage of 
         minorities enrolled in honors and AP classes 
         who scored over the 75th percentile in 
         reading or math in the spring of 1993 is 
         slightly greater than that of whites in all 4 
         school districts. 
 
              49. There is evidence that lower levels 
         of instruction may not encourage achievement 
         and may adversely affect the ability of a 
         student to attend college. 
 
Id. at 800-01 (citations omitted). 
         Taken together, these findings demonstrate that: (1) 
African-American students are less likely to be assigned to high- 
level classes than their white counterparts, and more likely to 
be placed in low-level classes [ 46]; and (2) these disparate 
assignments are made at least in part for reasons other than 
academic merit, since black students who perform as well as white 
students are "more likely to be placed on the lower level class 
than [are] white students" [ 47; see also  38, 48].  In the 
absence of alternative explanations, these findings permit the 
inference that the four districts' tracking practices may be 
based, at least in part, on racial considerations.  Furthermore, 
the court's findings demonstrate that these disparate tracking 
assignments may deprive African-American students of the 
opportunity to achieve the same level of academic success, 
including college admission, as their white counterparts [ 49]. 
         The district court made no additional finding of fact 
regarding alternate explanations for these "potentially 
troubling" findings, see Majority at 24.  Furthermore, whereas it 
was able to conclude, with regard to school-based student 
assignments, that "[t]he 4 districts are among the most racially 
balanced schools in the United States," see Coalition, 901 F. 
Supp. at 799,  29, it reached no such conclusion regarding 
tracking-based assignments.      
         The court did conclude as a legal matter that "there is 
no credible evidence linking any current racially identifiable 
conditions to the prior violation," id. at 823, and that "the 
vestiges of past discrimination have been eliminated to the 
extent practicable."  Id. at 823-24.  I believe that the evidence 
discussed supra does not support this conclusion.   
         First of all, the court's own findings constitute 
"credible evidence" potentially linking one racially identifiable 
condition -- i.e., the racial disparities in assignment to high- 
level and low-level classes -- to "the prior violation." 
         Second, while the findings regarding student tracking 
do not prove conclusively that the school districts discriminate 
in their tracking practices on the basis of race, they certainly 
do not support the opposite conclusion -- i.e., that the 
districts do not discriminate on the basis of race.  If anything, 
the court's findings create a presumption that race might be a 
factor in New Castle County's tracking practices.  Since the 
burden with regard to the Green factors -- including student 
assignments -- is on the Appellees to prove that the vestiges of 
segregation have been eliminated, and since the Appellees offered 
no explanation for the disparities in tracking, the uncertainty 
as to the cause of the disparities should be resolved in favor of 
the Coalition, and therefore the district court's conclusion that 
the vestiges have been eliminated, at least with regards to 
student classroom assignment, was unsupported and premature. 
                    2. The Majority's analysis 
         Despite the disparity between the court's own findings 
of fact and its conclusions of law, the Majority affirms the 
court's conclusion.  I believe that the Majority's position is 
based on the wrong standard of review, the wrong allocation of 
burdens and an unsustainable reading of the evidentiary record.   
                               (a) 
         First, the Majority defines "our task" as "to inquire 
whether the district court's determination of the districts' 
unitary status was clearly erroneous."  Majority at 26.  The 
district court's determination as to unitary status, however, is 
one not of fact, which we would review for clear error, but of 
law, see Coalition, 901 F. Supp. at 822-23, which as is customary 
we subject to plenary review. 
                               (b) 
         Second, time and again the Majority dismisses the 
import of the district court's factual findings by resolving gaps 
in the evidentiary record and ambiguities as to those factual 
findings in favor of the Appellees, despite the fact that by its 
own acknowledgment, and that of Appellees, Appellees bear the 
burden of showing that the vestiges of discrimination have been 
eliminated. 
         (i) The Majority dismisses the district court's finding 
that "among high school students who achieve identical testing 
scores, black students were more likely to be placed in the lower 
level class than were white students," Coalition, 901 F. Supp. at 
801,  47, as "no[] . . . evidence that black students have not 
received equal opportunity."  Majority at 25.  While the Majority 
concedes that this "potentially troubling" finding might 
"suggest[] on its face that black students may have been 
segregated from white students of equal testing aptitude," id. at 
24, it rejects this conclusion on the ground that the comparison 
did not "consider[] as well the important factor of academic 
achievement based on course performance," and that "it is not 
clear whether the placement at issue was requested or required."  
Id. at 25. 
         Of course, the evidentiary gaps that the Majority 
identifies do not nullify the import of the district court's 
finding as to potential disparate treatment of equally qualified 
students based on race.  Furthermore, these gaps should not serve 
to exonerate the party that bears the burden of proof; 
uncertainty as to the significance of the district court's 
factual finding should not be resolved in favor of the party that 
bears the burden. 
         (ii) The Majority dismisses the district court's 
finding that "the percentage of minorities enrolled in honors and 
AP classes who scored over the 75th percentile in reading or math 
in the spring of 1993 is slightly greater than that of whites in 
all 4 school districts," Coalition, 901 F. Supp. at 801,  48, as 
"so limited, and thus malleable, a sample," Majority at 25, as to 
allow any number of inferences.  Specifically, while the Majority 
acknowledges that "this finding could . . . give rise to an 
inference that blacks must perform at a higher level than whites 
in order to be placed in honors and AP classes," it suggests that 
"we may just as reasonably infer something quite different: that 
the school districts' good faith efforts to desegregate have paid 
off in terms of the improved testing performance of black 
students."  Id. at 25-26. 
         The Majority's inference, even assuming that it is one 
an appellate court could draw, is unconvincing at best: the issue 
is not whether some black students perform well, but rather 
whether black students must perform better than whites to be 
placed in honors and AP classes, which the district court's 
finding clearly suggests.  In any case, once again it is 
inappropriate -- and legally erroneous -- to dismiss the 
Coalition's interpretation because another interpretation, more 
favorable to Appellees, is possible when the burden lies with 
Appellees. 
         (iii) The Majority dismisses the district court's 
finding that "[t]he extent to which elementary and middle school 
students are placed in classes according to their ability is 
unclear from the record," Coalition, 901 F. Supp. at 800,  36, 
as "mean[ing] little on its own, for it represents merely that 
there is uncertainty in the record about how elementary and 
middle school students are placed in classes according to their 
ability."  Majority at 26. 
         True enough.  However, uncertainty about student 
placement merely demonstrates that Appellees have failed to meet 
their burden of showing that the vestiges of discrimination have 
been eliminated.  To suggest otherwise is to misallocate the 
evidentiary burden. 
         (iv) The Majority dismisses the district court's 
finding of "[e]vidence that lower levels of instruction may not 
encourage achievement and may adversely affect the ability of a 
student to attend college," Coalition, 901 F. Supp. at 801,  49, 
as "not establish[ing] anything specific about whether that 
putative problem is related to disparate educational opportunity 
or treatment according to race."  Majority at 29. 
         The significance of this finding, however, is not to 
demonstrate that black students are channeled to lower-level 
classes, but that if they are, this would have a deleterious 
effect on their level of academic achievement.  This finding, 
when read in the context of the district court's other findings 
suggesting that students are assigned to different levels of 
instruction based on race, is ominous and suggests that the poor 
performance of black students in a number of areas might not be 
related solely to socioeconomic factors. 
                               (c) 
         At the end of its analysis, the Majority proclaims that 
"[a]s we already have made clear, [the basis on which students 
are placed in lower levels of instruction] was not racially 
discriminatory."  Majority at 29.  In fact, neither the district 
court's findings nor even the Majority's analysis supports such a 
conclusion.  At best, they suggest that the record is 
indeterminate regarding whether students are assigned to certain 
levels of instruction on the basis of race -- i.e., that 
Appellees have failed to establish that in the area of student 
assignment, the vestiges of discrimination have been eliminated 
to the extent practicable. 
                          3. Conclusion 
         For the foregoing reasons, I would remand to the 
district court for further findings regarding the racial 
disparities in tracking. 
                        B. Certified staff 
         Regarding the issue of staff assignment, the district 
court noted that "[t]he staff is divided into three subsections: 
administrative staff, certified staff, and classified staff."  
Coalition, 901 F. Supp. at 802,  50.  As the court explained, 
"'[c]ertified staff' includes nonadministrative certified 
personnel such as teachers, psychologists, speech and hearing 
therapists, educational diagnosticians and other 'instructional 
and pupil support personnel.'"  Id.,  52.   
         Except for teachers, the court made no finding 
regarding the racial identifiability of the schools with respect 
to the certified staff.  Similarly, the Majority discusses the 
districts' efforts regarding the faculties, Majority at 33-35, 
and the "non-professional" or "classified" staff only, id. at 35- 
36, but in no way discusses the districts' efforts regarding 
certified staff. 
         No one disputes that these professionals were included 
in the 1978 Order, and I see no reason for the district court's 
omission.  Therefore, I would remand to the court for further 
findings regarding whether vestiges with regard to certified 
staff have been eliminated. 
                     C. Communication skills 
         The 1978 Order required the districts (which at the 
time were consolidated into a single district) "to institute an 
affirmative reading and communication skills program which does 
not resegregate pupils."  Evans, 447 F. Supp. at 1015-16.  I do 
not dispute the Majority's conclusion that "the districts . . . 
met the standard of good faith compliance with" the Order 
regarding reading skills.  See Majority at 45.  However, the 
district court made not a single finding regarding the 
implementation of a communication skills program.  See Coalition, 
901 F. Supp. at 809-10,  168-185. 
         The Majority contends that this oversight is 
inconsequential because "there is no meaningful distinction 
between reading skills programs and communication skills 
programs," Majority at 47, and that "'reading skills' and 
'communications skills' are synonymous for purposes of our 
analysis here."  Id. at 48.  However, there is no support in the 
record to read the "communication skills" requirement as mere 
surplusage.  I cannot agree with the Majority's suggestion, 
eighteen years after the fact, that the language of the 1978 
Order was merely sloppy or redundant.  This suggestion is not 
only in contradiction with the careful analysis of the district 
court at the time, but also with the plain meaning of the words.  
Reading and communication are different forms of human activity, 
and they involve different skills.  Therefore, I would remand to 
the district court for further findings in this area. 
                       D. Areas of concern 
         In addition to the so-called Green factors and the 
ancillary relief measures outlined by the district court in 1978, 
the district court considered several "areas of concern" for 
possible discriminatory practices: student achievement; special 
education; and dropout rates.  Coalition, 901 F. Supp. at 818-22.  
As the Majority acknowledges, there is no dispute that 
significant disparities along racial lines remain in these 
various areas.  See Majority at 57.  The issue is whether these 
disparities are legally cognizable vestiges of de juresegregation.  The 
district court concluded that "[t]here is no 
credible evidence demonstrating that the differences between 
black and white children's success in school can be attributed to 
the former de jure segregated school system."  Coalition, 901 F. 
Supp. at 823. 
         In a very real sense, there can be no doubt that the 
condition of many African-Americans in our society is a lasting 
legacy of a time when people of color as a matter of law were 
denied equality of opportunity.  However, the Supreme Court has 
made it clear that not all vestiges of de jure segregation are 
"the concern of the law," but only those that "have a causal link 
to the de jure violation being remedied."  Freeman v. Pitts, 503 
U.S. 467, 496 (1992). 
         With regard to the Green factors, causality is 
presumed.  As the Majority explains, "the Green factors have 
become per se vestiges of de jure segregation."  Majority at 58.  
Causality is also presumed for the ancillary relief measures 
contained in the 1978 Order.  But the issue of establishing 
causality is a more difficult one in the case of the identified 
performance disparities. 
         I agree with the Majority that under the typical 
scenario, "[b]ecause the performance disparities claimed by 
Appellant are not among (or even similar to) the Green factors or 
the vestiges identified in the 1978 Order, we will not simply 
presume . . . that these are vestiges of de jure segregation."  
Majority at 59.  I also agree with the Majority, however, that if 
the district court ultimately were to find that the school 
district has not achieved unitary status, the burden would shift 
and the plaintiffs would be entitled to a presumption of 
causality.  See id. at 60 (citing Vaughns by Vaughns v. Bd. of 
Educ. of Prince George's County, 758 F.2d 983, 990-91 (4th Cir. 
1985)). 
         As I explain supra, I believe that remand is 
appropriate in the instant matter for further findings regarding 
classroom assignment.  If the district court were to conclude on 
remand that students are assigned to different levels of 
education based on race, under Vaughns v. Vaughns such a finding 
would create a presumption of causal relationship between the dejure 
violation and the disparities in achievement, and the 
evidentiary burden would shift to Appellees.  We note, too, that 
this presumption would be entirely consistent with the district 
court's own finding that "lower levels of instruction may not 
encourage achievement and may adversely affect the ability of a 
student to attend college."  Coalition, 901 F. Supp. at 801,  
49. 
         Because any conclusion the court draws regarding class 
placement may affect its conclusion that "[t]here is no credible 
evidence demonstrating that the differences between black and 
white children's success in school can be attributed to the 
former de jure segregated school system," id. at 823, I would 
vacate the court's conclusion regarding the so-called areas of 
concern and remand for reconsideration in light of the above. 
             E. Exclusion of Jan de Leeuw's testimony 
         The Coalition argued on appeal that the district court 
improperly excluded expert testimony it sought to present to 
rebut the defendant' own experts, and that it was prejudiced by 
the exclusion.  The Majority correctly notes that "[a] trial 
judge's exclusion of testimony cannot be disturbed on appeal 
'absent a clear abuse of discretion.'"  Majority at 56 (citing 
Semper v. Santos, 845 F.2d 1233, 1238 (3d Cir. 1988); Fashauer v. 
New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, 57 F.3d 1269, 1287 (3d Cir. 
1995)).  However, review is plenary when the district court's 
evidentiary ruling "implicates 'the application of a legally set 
standard.'"  Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1496 (3d Cir. 
1993) (quoting Savarese v. Agriss, 883 F.2d 1194, 1200 (3d Cir. 
1989)). 
                       1. Factual findings 
         On November 2, 1994, the district court issued an order 
setting up, inter alia, the framework for pre-trial discovery.  
In particular, the court ordered that by November 9, 1994, "each 
party [should] designate which of its experts [would] testify at 
trial and the specific subject matter as to which each expert 
[would] testify."  Coalition to Save our Children v. Delaware 
Board of Education, Nos. 1816-1822-SLR, slip op. at 4 (D. Del. 
Nov. 2, 1994) (Order) (JA 318).  The court further ordered the 
parties to "exchange expert reports, the content of which will 
comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)" by November 23.  Id., 
slip op. at 5 (JA 319). 
         The Coalition submitted its list of experts on November 
17.  Among those listed was Dr. Jan de Leeuw, Director of the 
UCLA Statistical Consulting Center.  Redesignation of Expert 
Witnesses, Coalition to Save our Children v. State Board of 
Education, C.A. No. 1816-1822 SLR, slip op. at 2 (D. Del. Nov. 
17, 1994) (JA 346).  Dr. de Leeuw was to "be called as an expert 
witness in the fields of statistical consultation, data analysis, 
and related matters."  Id. 
         Dr. de Leeuw submitted his Report on Creation and Use 
of Database (hereinafter the "de Leeuw Report") on November 29, 
1994.  JA 4041.  The report deals exclusively with the 
preparation and construction of the database.  One section, 
entitled "Goal of Analysis," explains: 
         The analysis consists of providing expert 
         witnesses with tables.  The tables depicted 
         the racial composition of districts and 
         schools with regard to outcomes of interest.  
         These tables provide the actual number and 
         percentages of students who fall within each 
         of these categories.  In addition, the tables 
         include marginal (or conditional) 
         percentages. 
De Leeuw Report at 14 (JA 4055).   
         An attorney for the school system wrote to the court on 
December 1 protesting that "the expert reports provided by 
Plaintiff were incomplete," Letter from Rodman Ward, Jr. to Judge 
Sue L. Robinson (Dec. 1, 1994) (JA 362), and asking that the 
Coalition provide "expert reports that comply fully with Rule 
26(a)(2)(B)" by December 9.  Id.; see also Letter from Rodman 
Ward, Jr. to Thomas D. Barr (Dec. 2, 1995) (JA 384).  The 
Coalition apparently did not supplement Dr. de Leeuw's report by 
that date.  Board's Brief at 55. 
         Dr. de Leeuw was deposed on December 15.  After being 
initially asked if he would be "offering any opinions in this 
matter," he responded, "Opinions, no.  I have to describe the 
database construction, and I don't think that involves any 
opinions."  Deposition of Jan de Leeuw, Dec. 15, 1994 
(hereinafter the "de Leeuw Deposition") (JA 1562).   However, 
Thomas Henderson, a counsel for the Coalition, intervened later 
during the deposition to "give [the Board's counsel] notice that 
[Dr. de Leeuw] may testify as to materials and analyses, data . . 
. in the defendants [sic] reports."  Id. (JA 1563).  Describing 
this intervention as "a real problem," Andre G. Bouchard, the 
school system's counsel, requested that he be given notice if the 
Coalition intended to call Dr. de Leeuw to testify about 
"anything outside of his report."  Id.  Mr. Henderson responded, 
"Well, I heard your request and it's on the record, and I will 
consider that."  Id. 
         The same day, the Coalition informed the defendants of 
its intention to call three new rebuttal experts.  One of these 
witnesses was Dr. Franklin Fisher, a professor of economics at 
M.I.T., who was to testify on the statistical analysis methods 
used in the reports by Dr. Rossell, Dr. Armor and Dr. Walberg, 
three of the Board's witnesses.  JA 858.  The defense objected 
during a hearing held on December 27, on the ground that Dr. 
Fisher's testimony would simply "duplicate what [it] thought Mr. 
Deleeuw [sic] was supposed to do."  JA 860.  The next day, the 
court sustained the objection and excluded the new experts' 
testimony: 
         The deadline for naming experts is long past.  
         The general context of defendants' experts' 
         testimony and methodology used by these 
         experts should have been of no surprise to 
         the plaintiff.  Defendants would be 
         prejudiced if these experts were allowed to 
         testify.  And plaintiff has not claimed 
         prejudice in the absence of their testimony. 
Tr. 1572 (JA 863).  The Coalition did not appeal the court's 
ruling. 
         On January 3, 1995, the day of Dr. de Leeuw's 
testimony, the Coalition's counsel handed to the defendants what 
defendants describe as "91 pages of charts and statistical data," 
Board's Brief at 56, and signaled that it intended to call Dr. de 
Leeuw to offer rebuttal testimony regarding the analyses of three 
experts for the defendants, Drs. Armor, Achilles and Reschly.  
Boards' Brief at 56.  The new testimony sought from Dr. de Leeuw 
was to be the same as that which the Coalition expected to elicit 
from Dr. Fisher, and that the court excluded on December 28.  JA 
1229.  This time again, however, the court excluded the testimony 
on the ground that the Coalition's effort failed to comply with 
the court's previous orders and with Rule 26. 
                        2. Legal analysis 
         The Coalition argues that the court's exclusion of Dr. 
de Leeuw's rebuttal testimony is contrary to Rule 703 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, as well as "normal practice and the 
common usage of expert witnesses."  Appellant's Brief at 47.  The 
Coalition further argues that exclusion of Dr. de Leeuw's 
testimony "does not make sense since Dr. de Leeuw's testimony was 
fashioned, and could only have been fashioned, after the cross- 
examination of the School System's witnesses and the production 
of data bases and disk files that were made during trial."  Id.at 47-48.  
Finally, the Coalition argues that the excluded 
testimony "would have demonstrated a series of methodological and 
analytical flaws fatally undermining [the Coalition's] 
testimony."  Id. at 47.  Because the district court failed to 
consider the importance of Dr. de Leeuw's proffered testimony, I 
would remand. 
                               (a) 
         I note, first, that Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence is inapposite to the dispute at hand.  Rule 703 states, 
inter alia: "The facts or data in the particular case upon which 
an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by 
or made known to the expert at or before the hearing."  The 
subject of the dispute over Dr. de Leeuw's testimony, and the 
reason for his exclusion, is the scope of his expertise as 
defined in the Coalition's November 30 report, and more 
specifically "whether at this late stage in the proceeding the 
plaintiff should be given the opportunity to present affirmative 
evidence by an expert never before qualified in" the area of 
student achievement.  JA 1230 (statement by The Court). 
         Similarly, the cases cited by the Coalition as 
evidencing "normal practice and the common usage of expert 
witnesses" are of no relevance in the instant case.  The issue in 
the first two cases was whether an expert should be allowed to 
testify after attending the testimony of other witnesses, 
allegedly in violation of an order by the court excluding all 
witnesses from the courtroom during trial.  United States v. 
Crabtree, 979 F.2d 1261, 1270 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 
S. Ct. 216 (1993); United States v. Bramlet, 820 F.2d 851, 855 
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 861 (1987).  Nor does the 
third case cited by the Coalition, an unreported district court 
opinion, offer any support for its argument.  Laysears v. 
Schindler Elevator Corp., No. Civ. A. 94-3152 (E.D. Penn. Sept. 
27, 1995). 
                               (b) 
         The Coalition next argues that Dr. de Leeuw's testimony 
could only have been fashioned after cross-examination of the 
Board's witnesses and the production of databases and disk files 
during trial.  There are two problems with this argument.  The 
first is that regardless of when specific data was given to the 
Coalition, the Coalition was aware all along that the school 
system would present statistical analyses as part of its 
argument, and it was aware by late November of the areas for 
which statistical analysis would be presented.  The second 
problem has to do with the chronology of what information was 
available and when.  As just noted, as of November 30, the 
Coalition knew the subjects on which the school system's various 
experts would testify, and the extent to which they relied on 
statistical analysis.  JA 1289.  As to specific experts, 
"anything that Dr. Achilles relied on in his testimony was 
entirely in the appendix to the report on the 30th in terms of 
all the backup data for his tables."  JA 1290.  Regarding Dr. 
Reschly's testimony, "the backup tables for all of that data [the 
data on which Dr. Reschly relied] were all contained in the 
appendix that [the school system] delivered on November 30th."  
Id.  Finally, as to Dr. Armor, it appears from the school 
system's uncontroverted testimony that "[h]is methodology is 
described in his report.  The statistical analysis is described 
in his report.  The assumptions that he made in his regression 
methodology is described carefully and fully in his report."  Id.  
Therefore, the only data that was missing as of December 1 was 
specific census data used by Dr. Armor in his work -- but again, 
while the Coalition may not have had all the data as of November 
30, it knew the scope and methodology of the testimony to be 
presented by the school system.  Therefore, the district court 
was certainly acting within its discretion when it found that the 
Coalition failed to comply with its orders regarding Dr. de 
Leeuw's belated testimony. 
                               (c) 
         Our analysis does not end with the district court's 
finding, however.  It has been the "consistent position" of the 
Third Circuit that "'the importance of the excluded testimony is 
one of the factors to be considered in deciding whether the trial 
court abused its discretion in excluding a witness.'"  Sowell v. 
Butcher & Singer, Inc., 926 F.2d 289, 302 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting 
Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Assn., 559 F.2d 894, 904 
(3d Cir. 1977), overruled on other grounds, Goodman v. Lukens 
Steel, 777 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 482 U.S. 656 
(1987)).  Other factors include: "bad faith on the part of the 
party seeking to call witnesses not listed in his pretrial 
memorandum," Meyers, 559 F.2d at 904; "ability of the party to 
have discovered the witnesses earlier," id.;  "validity of the 
excuse offered by the party," id.; "willfulness of the party's 
failure to comply with the court's order," id.; and "the parties' 
intent to confuse or mislead his [sic] adversary."  Id..  As the 
court in Meyers explained, the following "basic considerations" 
should guide the court's decision: 
         (1) the prejudice or surprise in fact of the 
         party against whom the excluded witnesses 
         would have testified, (2) the ability of that 
         party to cure the prejudice, (3) the extent 
         to which waiver of the rule against calling 
         unlisted witnesses would disrupt the orderly 
         and efficient trial of the case or of other 
         cases in the court, and (4) bad faith or 
         willfulness in failing to comply with the 
         court's order. 
Id.at 904-05; see also DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 580 
F.2d 1193, 1201-02 (3d Cir. 1978). 
         Furthermore, "the likelihood of finding an abuse of 
discretion is affected by the importance of the district court's 
decision to the outcome of the case and the effect it will have 
on important rights."  In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 
35 F.3d 717, 750 (3d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted), cert. deniedsub nom. 
General Electric Co. v. Ingram, 115 S. Ct. 1253 (1995). 
         There is no evidence in the record that the district 
court considered the importance of Dr. de Leeuw's proffered 
testimony or several of the other factors outlined in Meyers.  
Therefore, I believe that we should vacate the district court's 
decision to exclude Dr. de Leeuw's belated testimony and remand 
to the district court for the more complete consideration of Dr. 
de Leeuw's testimony that the law of this Circuit demands. 
 
                         III. Conclusion 
         The presence of a number of young black students at the 
argument of this matter should serve as a compelling reminder to 
us that while we struggle over the sufficiency of proof and 
allocation of burdens, our decision today directly affects the 
education and future of many of these young people. 
         As I cannot join the opinion of the Majority on the 
legal grounds outlined above, neither can I join the condemnation 
of Coalition's counsel.  Without the zealous advocacy 
demonstrated throughout this case's history, much of what has 
been accomplished in the past two decades would not have been.   
         Nor can I join in the Majority's criticism of "the 
micromanagement of [segregated] school systems by the federal 
courts."  Majority at 67.  The courts assumed their role in these 
matters not out of an unquenchable thirst for power or a desire 
to intrude upon the province of others, but because of the 
failure of those charged with the responsibility of ending 
segregation to fulfill the duties imposed upon them and respond 
voluntarily to the commands of Brown.  The courts' authority in 
these matters does not spring from arrogance, nor does it merely 
"inhere in equity jurisdiction."  Id.  It is rooted in the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.   
         Much time has elapsed since the State of Delaware was 
first ordered to desegregate its schools and, admittedly, much 
has been accomplished.  But unless and until we can be certain 
that all of the vestiges of past discrimination have been 
eliminated to the extent practicable, supervision should not be 
abandoned.  Considering that we are dealing here with the 
education and future of a large number of tomorrow's leaders, to 
trade additional time for greater equality is not a bad bargain. 
         Accordingly, I would remand for further consideration 
and findings consistent with this opinion. 
